DISCLAIMER
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
It is sometimes the case in PRA applications that repofled plant-specific failure data are, in fact, only estimates which are uncertain. Even for detailed plant-specific data, the reported exposure time or number of demands is often oniy an estimate of the actual exposure time or number of demands. Likewise, the reported num~r of failure events or incidents is sometimes also uncertain because incident or malfunction reports may be ambiguous. In this repofi we determine the corresponding uncertainty in core damage frequency which can be attributed to such unceflainties in nuclear power reactor example.
For the case in which all plant-specific data using a sir,lple (but typical) the plant-specific data used in the PRA are uncertain to the extent that each of the reported values may be in error by as much as a factor of 3, the width of the 90°/0 uncertainty interval for the corresponding annual core damage frequency can increase by as much as a factor of 5. In addition, the mean core damage frequency can also increase by as much as a factor of 3.
Because it is now feasible to do so, we recommend that existing Level 1 PRA computer codes (such as the Level 1 codes in SAPHIRE) be internally enhanced and upgraded !O accommodate such data uncertainties. This would provide a convenient way for PRA analysts to (1) properly account for such uncertainties In PRA applications, !hus increasing the accuracy and precision of the PRA results; and (2) determine the driving data unce~ainties which have the most relevant and influential effect on the PRA results. It is sometimes the case that such reported plant-specific data are, in fact, only estimates which are uncertain. Although the statistical issue of uncertainties in (y, n) and (x, t) and their treatment is long-standing, it was first formally raised and discussed in PRA by Siu and Apostolakisa and Parrys. Mosleh4 refers to such uncertainty as hidden uncertainty, because it is usually not explicitly quantified in the data analysis for PRA. Even for detailed plant-specific data, the reported exposure time t or number of demands is often only an estimate of the actual exposure time or number of demands. Mosleh4 describes a case in which, for several possible reasons, a reported exposure time was subsequently found to be a factor of 3 smaller than the actual (true) exposure time.
The repofied values of y or x can also be uncenain. For example, it is sometimes the case that the available information on a padicular component incident (malfunction) report is so unclear and/or incomplete that a definitive classification of the event as having actually occurred is aifficult or impossible.
This leads to uncertainty regarding the true value of y or x.
Martz and PiCards and Martz, Kvam, and AtwoodG present camputationally convenient methods to account for uncertainties in either (x, t) or (y, n) when using Bayesian methods to estimate A or p, respectively. These methods bypass the need for numerical integration, thus making them easy to implement in practice. They also quantify the broadening effect that accounting for these uncertainties has on the usual 90% Bayesian credibility (or unceilainty) intervals for both 1 and p.
The purpose of this repofi is to determine the comesponding uncertainty in core damage frequency which can be attributed to uncertainties in both (x, t) and/or (y, n). To fully accomplish this purpose would require the use of numerous nuclear reactor plant-specific PRAs, which is clearly beyond the scope and resources available for this task. Thus, a single (but typical) simple example is used to make a preliminary assessment of me effect of accounting fcr (or, conversely, ignoring) such uncertainties. The example is described in Section 2 and Section 3 contains the results of the preliminary assessment. Some general recommendations are given in Section 4.
EXAMPLE
Consider the 2 nuclear power reactor standby emergency systems in Figure 1 which, among other things, are designed to operate in the event of a loss of offsite power (LOSP). The 2 systems depicted in Figure 1 are a 2-train standby emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and a 2-train standby containment spray system (CSS). Each of these 2 systems consists of 2 parallel trains having a pump, check valve (CV) and motor operated valve (MOV) in series. In addition to the pumps, valves, and storage tank indicated in Figure 1 , there are also 2 emergency diesel generators (labeled DG-A and DG-B) which are used to provide emergency AC power for operating the motor operated valves and pumps in these 2 systems in the event of a LOSP. The particular diesel generator used to provide the AC power to operate the respective compc?ents is also indicated in Figure 1 . We will also assume throughout that either one of the 2 parallel trains in each of these 2 systems is sufficient to accomplish the corresponding cooling and pressurization control functions; that is, for each system the success criterion we consider is 1-out-of-2. We consider the case of common, plar?t-specific data for the CV, MOV, diesel driven pump, and diesel generator. Table 1 
contains the Nuclear
Computerized Library for Assessing Reactor Reliability (NUCLARR) plantspecific dataT that we cunsider here for each of these conlponents and for the required demand-dependent failure modos. Note also, however, that although these data are from different plants, they are representative of the data likely tb e obtained from a typical plant and are adequate for our purposes here. The corresponding NUCl&tR record numberT is also indicated in Table 1 .
As stated in the Introduction, we consider Bayesian estimation of the failure on d~mand probability p. 
No{e that the net effect of the prior is essentially to contribute 0.5 "prior" failures in 1 "prior demand to the Bayes estimate. For each of the components and data I;sted in Table 1 , the corresponding Bayesian~int estimates~are also given. 
In the case where x = 3 and t = 6 years, we have~= 0.58 events per year.
Let us now hypothetically assume that the values of y and n given in Table   1 are only "es~imates" which are unceflain. Martz, Kvam, and AtwoodG describe a methodology for use in accounting for uncertainties in y and n. For the case of uncertain n, they suggest using a subjective Iognormal distribution to capture and express the uncertainty in n whose median (or mean) is given by the stated value (which is now considered to be only an estimate) of n. They then suggest approximating the true averaga posterior distribution of p by a beta distribution whose first 2 moments approximately match the corresponding moments of the true average posterior distribution of p. They also determined that this approximation is excellent in all of the cases that they have considered;
corisequently, we consider this beta approximation here. Also, a Jeffreys'
noninformative Beta(p; 0.5, 0.5) distribution is used throughout.
Because of Mosleh4's finding that exposure times can IM in error by as much as a factor of 3, we treat this as the extreme (boundary) case and consider an approximate error factor of 3 in all cases in which n is uncertain. Thus, we consider a lognormal distribution having the specified mean listed in the "Demands n" column in Table 1 and corresponding error factor of 3 (at the 959f0 confidence le"~el).
For the case of uncertain y or x, Mar&, Kvam, and AtwoodG propose using a maximum entropy distribution, having a specified finite support, whose mean is likewise given by the specified estimate of y listed in Table 1 . We likewise consider an approximate factor of 3 error in y which we use to define the supporl for y. For each of the components in Table 1 , as well as the LOSP init~ating event, Table 2 gives the mean of y (or x) and associated support that we use to construct the corresponding maximum entr~py distribution on y. Note that, except for LOSP, the upper limit of the support is a factor of 3 greater than the mean.
The support for the LOSP uncertainty in x in Table 2 actually reflects true, plantspecific uncertainty in the number of LOSP events that should be counted as having occurred at the given facility. Table 3 gives the beta distribution parameters a and b for the beta approximation to the average posterior distribution of p (see Reference 6) for each of the components for 4 different cases: no uncertainty in either y or n; only uncertainty in n; only uncertainty in y; and uncertainty in both y and n. The case in which there is no uncertainty in either y or n serves as a baseline case for comparison with the remaining 3 cases. Following Martz and Picards, Table 4 gives the gamma distribution shape and scale parameters a and b, respectively, for the gamma approximation to the average posterior clisttibution of the LOSP frequency per year A for these same 4 cases, which now involve x and t instead ofyandn.
Now consider the increase in uncertainty in our Rayesian estimates of p and A as a consequence of accounting for the hypothesized uncertainty in (y, n)
and (x, t). Table 5 gives the ratio of the width of the 90'%0Bayesian credibility internal for each of the 3 cases involving uncertainty in y andor n (or x and/or t)
to the width of the corresponding interval for the baseline case. For example, we see from Table 5 that, in the case of a CV, the 90'% uncertainty interval for the probability of failure to operate per demand in which the y = 2 failures in n = 191 repofied demands are both uncertain (to the extent described above) is over twice as wide (a factor of 2.2) than the comesponding interval in which there is no uncertainty in either of these values y or n. We also note that the indicated uncedainty in y or x appears to have less effect than the indicated uncwtainty in n or t. Also, as expected, the case in which both y and n 'or x and t) are uncertain has a greater effect than the case in which only y or n (or x or t) is uncertain.
CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY RESULTS
We now consider the uncertainty in core damage frmuency corresponding to the uncor!ainties in the component failure probabilities and LOSP frequency of occurrence presented in Section 2. We propagate the component uncertainties using Monte Carlo simulation in conjunction with the minimal cut set representations fur core damage sequences 2 and 3 given in Figures 5 and 6 .
Tho Monte Cario simulation was carried out to a depth of 10,000 replications. The same 4 cases cmsidefed in Section 2 are likewise considered here:
(1) no uncwt@w in any of the (y. n) or (x, t) values; (2) uncertainty in only and all of the values of n and t; (3) uncertainty in onfy and all of the vafues of y and x;
and (4) uncertainty in all of the (y, n) and (x, t) vafues. As in -on 2, the resutts *tifi~m Smma~tiw~@r uinmm@~t~mWhstim each of the remaining cases. In addtion to these 4 cases, a~h case is also cmsklered. Because the number of plant-specilk LOSP events x that OCUJriedin the 6 year exposure time period is trufy uncertain, it was decided to include the case in which only the LOSP x value is uwertain as a fifth case. Table 6 gives the mean probabilities (the Bayesian point estimates) of each of the basic events in the fault trees in Figures 3 and 4 as well as the mean LOSP annual frequency of occurrence. We fufiher assume here that the uncertainty in the probability p that the TANK fails on demand can be adequately expressed using a truncat~Iognormal distribution (truncated at 1.0) with parameters u = -16 and u = 1.4. Note that these parameters produce a median value of p of 1.0 x 10-7, a mean value of p of 2.7 x 10-7, and an error factor of 10.
Although all of the basic fauft tree events are considered to be independent, because the plant-specific data pertains to each class of CVS, MOVS, diesel driven pumps, and diesel generators, we only considered 6 random variables in the simulation; namely, C-CV-A, C-MOV-l, C-PUMP-A, DG-A, TANK, and LOSP.
All of the remaining basic events were considered to be perfectly correlated with these 6 basic events; thus, the same random probabilities generated for these 6 basic events were used in the Monte Carlo simulation for the remaining basic event probabilities in each corresponding class of components. For estimating the probability of each of the 2-component con.mon cause basic events in Figures 3 and 4 we used a simple beta factor of 0.1 (see Table 6 ). frequency which can be directly attributed to uncertainties in the plant-specific data as indicated by each case. We obseme that the cases in which all values of n and t are uncertain increase the overall uncertainty in core damage frequency by as much as a factor of 3. We also note that the case in which only the LOSP value of x is uncwlain has virtually no effect on the mean, median, or width of the 90~0 intewal.
Similarly, Table 8 gives the Monte Carlo uncertainty analysis results for sequence numbr 3 for each of the same 5 cases. The results are further exaggerated beyond those in Table 7 . We see that, for the cases in which all the values of n and t are uncertain, the mean core damage frequency is more than a factor of 3 larger, while the width of the 90% ur,certainty internal is between a factor of 4 to 5 wider, than the baseline case.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The resutts in Tables 7 and 8 are thought to be bounding results because all of the uncertainties considered for y, n, x, and t roughly represented an error factor of 3. We believe that a simultaneous error factor of 3 in all the plantspecific data values thus represents a clear bounding case. As to whether or not a fivefold increase in the uncertainty of core damage frequency is sufficiently important to merit furlher study of this issue, depends on the particular situation regarding the use and importance of the Level 1 PRA results. Such an increase either may or may not be sufiaently important to warrant further consideration of such data uncertainties. Because not only the uncertainty in core damage frequency, but the mean and median as well, also increase in proportion to the degree of uncertainty in the plant-specific data, it is our belief that more careful attention should be given in future PRAs to the consideration, accommodation, and propagation of such data uncertainties when there is justifiable reasons for their existence. 
